We use data on imports of computer equipment for a large sample of countries between 1970 and 1990 to investigate the determinants of computer-technology adoption. We Þnd strong evidence that computer adoption is associated with higher levels of human capital and with manufacturing trade openness vis-a-vis the OECD. We also Þnd evidence that computer adoption is enhanced by high investment rates, good property rights protection, and a small share of agriculture in GDP. Finally, there is some evidence that adoption is reduced by a large share of government in GDP, and increased by a large share of manufacturing. After controlling for the above-mentioned variables, we do not Þnd an independent role for the English-(or European-) language skills of the population.
Introduction
It has long been recognized that increases in technical efficiency play a critical role in longterm growth. For high-income countries this has led researchers to focus attention on the R&D process. For low-income countries -which are presumed to operate inside the technological frontier -an additional source of efficiency gains is to be found in the adoption of technologies already developed in technologically advanced countries. 1 Yet not much is known empirically on the determinants of technology adoption. This paper presents a case study of the diffusion of computer technology around the World. In particular, it tries to identify variables that predict adoption of computers in a panel of countries.
Computers make for an ideal case study of technology diffusion. First, they have been introduced recently, i.e. after or in conjunction with the inception of the relevant data collection processes. This allows us to catch the process from its very beginning. Second, computers constitute a clear case of embodied technology: a country cannot adopt computer technology without physically installing computers. Hence, a measure of the computing capacity installed is a direct measure of technology adoption. In contrast, it is very hard to measure the diffusion of technologies that are disembodied.
Of course direct measures of investment in computing equipment do not exist for large enough a number of countries and long enough a time span. 2 However, we argue that measures of imports of computing equipment are likely to be adequate proxies of such investments. This is because most countries in the World simply do not have a computermaking industry -and this was especially true at the beginning of the diffusion stage. For these countries, the capacity installed is the capacity imported. In other words, technology diffusion takes place through imports of the equipment embodying the technology.
We have detailed data on imports of computer equipment for virtually all countries in the World, starting in 1970. Hence, this paper will use panel data to seek to empirically characterize the determinants of imports of computers across countries. Our strongest Þnd-ings are that computer adoption is associated with high levels of human capital, and with manufacturing trade openness vis-a-vis the OECD. We also Þnd considerable evidence that computer adoption is enhanced by good property rights protection, high rates of investment per worker, and a small share of agriculture in GDP. There is also some evidence for a negative role of the size of government, and a positive role of the share of manufacturing in GDP.
1 Macroeconomic evidence that poor countries operate inside the technology frontier can be found in (among others) Francesco Caselli, Gerardo Esquivel and Fernando Lefort (1996) , Peter Klenow and Andres RodriguezClare (1997) , Robert Hall and Charles Jones (1999) , and Caselli and John Coleman (2000) .
2 The UNDP has a data set with stock of personal computer for the 1990s. Jong-Wha Lee (2001) has examined these data and -consistent with our results -has found a strong role for human capital.
and the coming of age of the computer revolution. Information on computer imports is available on 155 countries, though the country coverage for most of our empirical work will shrink because of limitations in the covariates we use. We express the import data in per-worker terms by dividing aggregate computer imports by the labor force, as measured by the World Bank (1999).
We believe computer imports per worker to be an adequate measure of computer investment per worker for a large majority of the countries in the World. Simply put, the computer industry is well known to be highly concentrated internationally, with a handful of countries providing most of the World's computer output. For this reason, computer imports and computer investment are probably very closely associated. A check of this idea based on computer exports per worker gives a somewhat ambiguous response. The percentage of countries in the sample with no reported computer exports falls from 58% in 1970 to 13% in 1990. Hence, a sizeable fraction of the sample appear to be exporting some computersperhaps suggesting the existence of a domestic computer industry, after all -especially in the later period of coverage. However, inspection of the data reveals that most of the positives are trivial in amount -suggesting to us that almost certainly these exports reßect re-exports or statistical anomalies.
In order to deal with the ambiguous message from the export data, in our empirical work we work with three data sets of computer adoption. The Þrst data set proxies computer adoption with computer imports and uses the full sample. The second uses the same adoption variable, but limits the sample to those countries with no reported computer exports. This is clearly overkill, as it excludes some countries that cannot be plausibly deemed to produce their computers domestically. But any alternative cut-off criteria would be arbitrary, and this stringent criterion allows us to check the robustness of the results from the full sample. 4 The third data set uses production data from UNIDO (2000) to construct an adoption variable based on the formula: adoption = production+imports-exports. One shortcoming of this (otherwise ideal) adoption variable is that the production data pertain to a somewhat broader category of equipment, namely Office, Computing, and Accounting Machinery (OCAM), so its identiÞcation with computer adoption is not as tight. 5 More distressingly, the country coverage is quite limited. Furthermore, time coverage for these data for a reasonable number of countries only starts in the 1980s. The important point, however, is that, as it will be seen, some key results are fairly similar in the three samples. for the three samples. The table attests to the very large differences across countries within each period. Most variables are reported in current-dollar levels, and should therefore not be used for intertemporal comparisons. The only exception is the log-variance, which should be roughly unit-free, and is perhaps suggestive of some reduction in dispersion over time -perhaps a sign that Mr. Clinton's "digital divide" may be shrinking (at least among countries). To provide an additional preliminary look at the data, Figure 1 the Appendix, together with their World Bank codes and the raw computer-import data. In using the current US-dollar value of computer-imports to compare computer adoption across countries at a given point in time we are implicitly assuming that computer prices obey purchasing power parity. Given the absolute absence of computer-price indices for all but a few countries we frankly admit we have no way of backing up this assumption. Even for the USA, the existing deßators are surrounded by considerable controversy, and different deßators behave wildly differently. For these reasons, in this paper we eschew inter-temporal comparisons: all our empirical work will handle intertemporal variation through time dummies which -assuming again that the law of one price holds -should absorb changes in the dollar price of computing power. We leave the study of intertemporal patterns of computer adoption to future work.
Our strategy to investigate the determinants of differences in computer-technology adoption is to look at a variety of regression results using speciÞcations of the form
where I it c is computer imports per worker (in current US dollars) in country i and year t, X it is a set of explanatory variables, δ t is a set of year dummies, η i is a country effect, and u it is independently and identically distributed among countries and years. All the variables we will include in the vector X are available at annual frequency, except for our measure of human capital, which is only available at 5-year intervals. Since this variable turns out to be a key determinant of computer adoption, our regressions are based on data for the years 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, and 1990 . Depending on the sample, the country coverage varies roughly between 40 and 90. 6
In cross-country studies of this kind there is considerable controversy regarding the appropriate estimation technique, and in particular regarding the treatment of the countryspeciÞc term, η i . The basic choice is between random effects (RE) and Þxed effects (FE). The RE estimator is the most efficient but is consistent under the most stringent assumptions, i.e.
that η i is uncorrelated with the vector X it . The FE estimator does not require this stringent assumption, but the country dummies absorb a lot of the variation in the data, making the estimator relatively inefficient. Our compromise solution in this "efficiency-consistency" trade off is to do a bit of both: we include a full set of regional dummies (Þxed region effects) and treat the residual country effect as random (random country effect). In other words, we do assume that η i is uncorrelated with X it , but we include in the latter a full set of regional dummies. This technique is consistent if the part of the country effect that is orthogonal to the region effect is also orthogonal to the remaining elements of X it . The advantage is that it is more efficient than the "Þxed country effect" estimator. It is important to acknowledge, however, that when we apply the Þxed country effect technique to the speciÞcation below we can identify virtually no signiÞcant explanatory variable. 7
We treat the vector X it as exogenous for log(I it ). Reverse causation is extremely unlikely to be a problem. For almost all countries in our samples computer adoption is 6 In view of the fact that several countries report 0 imports of computers the log speciÞcation may seem to generate sample selection. It turns out, however, that none of the country-year observations with 0 computer imports has complete data on the set of explanatory variables we employ, so taking logs per se does not induce any additional censoring. 7 The regional dummies are for: Sub-Saharan Africa; Latin America and Caribbean; Eastern Europe; Arab World; East Asia; Rest of Asia. In practice, the "omitted" region coincides almost perfectly with the OECD.
See the appendix for more details on country-year coverage and regional assignments.
extremely limited between 1970 and 1990, and it is unlikely to have caused changes in any of the macroeconomic variables on the right hand side. For example, it is highly unrealistic that computer adoption may have impacted the supply of human capital in countries other than the most advanced -and even there it is doubtful, before 1990. That reverse causation is not a major concern does not of course rule out the possibility that we have induced bias in our estimates by omitting some important explanatory variable.
We start with regressions on the full sample of countries. We then restrict ourselves to the sub-sample with no reported computer exports. Finally, we check the robustness of our results on the OCAM Sample. Similarly, we start with a pooled (panel) speciÞcation,
but we later present regressions run separately for the different years.
One word on our expositional strategy. In order to avoid repetitions, in documenting our results we proceed briskly and with a bare minimum of commentary. All matters of interpretation and relevance are deferred to the next (and concluding) section.
Full Sample
Table (2) reports the results from the all-country, all-year sample. The speciÞcation in Column I includes the basic set of explanatory variables that will be considered in this study: the log of real per-capita income; the log of real investment per worker; the share of agriculture in GDP; the share of manufacturing in GDP; the share of government spending in GDP; the extent of property-rights protection, as measured by an index -ranging from 1 to 10 -based on international surveys; the share of the population who speak English; human capital, as measured by the fraction of the labor force (over 15 years of age) who has at least a completed primary education; trade openness, as measured by the log of total imports per worker. Further details on these and the other data used in the paper are provided in the Appendix, which also lists the sources. 8 To conserve space, in the Tables we do not report the coefficients on the 5 year dummies and on the regional dummies. About the former we just note that they are as expected highly signiÞcant and growing very rapidly. On the latter we brießy report below.
In Column I the variables that have a statistically signiÞcant effect on computer adoption are per capita income (at the 10% level), investment per worker, the share of agriculture, human capital, and trade openness. Dropping the insigniÞcant variables one at a time does not make any of the others become signiÞcant.
In Column II we further investigate the role of human capital by breaking this variable up into the share of the labor force who has attained primary schooling but went no further 8 In the Appendix the reader can also Þnd a Table of univariate regressions of the dependent variable on each of the explanatory variables used in this study, one at a time.
(including those who attended without completing it), the share who has attained secondary schooling (and went no further), and the share who has attained higher education (the latter two groups form the composite human-capital variable used in the previous speciÞcations).
Hence, the omitted group is the completely uneducated. The point estimates increase sharply from primary to secondary education, but level off (in fact, slightly drop) from secondary to higher education. Only the coefficient on the fraction attaining secondary education is signiÞcantly different from 0. 9,10
We next further investigate the role of openness. In Column III we break down total import per worker by the identity of the trading partner -OECD vs non-OECD -and by the nature of the traded good -manufacturing goods versus non-manufacturing goods. 11
The result is that both origin and nature of the trade ßows matter: only manufacturing imports from the OECD help predict computer adoption. We have subjected this result to a battery of checks by including alternative openness-related variables, such as (bilateraltrade weighted) distance from the leading World exporters, measures of FDI inßows, the black market premium, and the Sachs-Warner openness measure. None of these entered signiÞcantly in our regressions nor did its inclusion affect the signiÞcance of other variables.
We next investigated a separate role for exports. When we include (the log of) total exports per worker we obtain a signiÞcantly (at the 10% level) positive coefficient on this variable, and no substantive change in the coefficients or signiÞcance of other variables (Column IV). When we further break down exports by nature and destination the signiÞcant (at the 10% level) components are manufacturing exports to the OECD and non-manufacturing exports to non-OECD countries (Column V). In this last speciÞcation the negative coefficient on non-manufacturing imports from non-OECD countries becomes statistically signiÞcant (at the 10% level) and the signiÞcance of the coefficient on investment changes from the 5% to 10% level.
Non-Exporting Sample
The Full Sample we have analyzed so far undoubtedly includes some countries that are producers of computing equipment. For these countries, computer imports may not be an 9 We also further broke down the labor force into Þner education categories: primary school completed; secondary school attained but not completed; secondary school completed; higher education attained but not completed; higher education completed. There seems to be a broad monotonicity in the coefficients, although there is a sharp and puzzling drop from higher education achieved to higher education completed. Only the coefficients on secondary and higher education attained are statistically signiÞcantly different from 0. 10 All the results are also essentially insensitive to looking at the corresponding shares for the labor force over 25 (instead of 25).
11 More accurately, we treat as OECD members those countries that were members as of 1990 (this excludes Korea, Mexico, and the Eastern European members). We further exclude Turkey and include Israel.
adequate measure of computer adoption. In this subsection we examine a sub-sample of countries that report no computer exports whatsoever. We are virtually certain that these countries have no computer industry, so for this sub-sample the identiÞcation of computer imports with computer adoption should be very tight.
Our approach is to run the same exact set of regressions on the sub-sample as we did on the full sample. The results are reported in Table ( 3). The results are consistent with those of the full sample as regards investment per worker; human capital; and manufacturing imports from OECD countries. But they differ in the following respects: per-capita income, the share of agriculture, and any export variable are no longer signiÞcant predictors of computer adoption; the property rights variable takes on a signiÞcantly positive value in some (but not all) speciÞcations; and, somewhat puzzlingly, imports of manufacturing from non-OECD countries are a signiÞcantly negative predictor of computer adoption (at the 10% level).
OCAM Sample
The Full Sample has ample country coverage, but underestimates computer adoption for those countries that have a substantial computer industry. The Non-Exporting Sample represents a radical but somewhat extreme solution to this problem. In this subsection we pursue an alternative solution, which is to focus on countries for which we have production data, so we can appropriately measure adoption as production plus net imports (i.e. imports minus exports). As discussed above, the price is a small country and time coverage (essentially only 1985 and 1990), as well as a less tight correspondence between the dependent variable -which now is OCAM -and the phenomenon we wish to explain. As for the Non-exporting Sample our strategy is to repeat the exact same battery of speciÞcations. The results are reported in Table 4 .
As in the Full Sample and in the Non-Exporting Sample, in the OCAM Sample human capital and manufacturing imports from the OECD are signiÞcantly positive predictors of computer adoption, though in the breakdown of the labor force by Þner education groups the OCAM Sample attributes a much larger premium to higher education. The OCAM Sample agrees with the Full Sample (but disagrees with the Non-Exporting Sample) in identifying the share of agriculture as a negative predictor of computer adoption, and in not attributing any role to manufacturing imports from non-OECD countries. It agrees with the Non-Exporting Sample (and disagrees with the Full Sample) in assigning no predictive power to per-capita income, and -in the speciÞcations with no export variables -in assigning a strong positive role to the protection of property rights. It differs from both in that investment per worker is not signiÞcant in the OCAM Sample, the share of manufacturing becomes signiÞcantly positive (from insigniÞcant), and the share of government spending in GDP becomes signiÞcantly negative (from insigniÞcant) -again in speciÞcations not involving export variables. for the early years (the binding constraint is the property rights indicator). Hence, we limit ourselves to reporting results including the Full Sample of countries. We also limit ourselves to reporting a somewhat parsimonious version of the speciÞcations in the previous tables. Not surprisingly, the greatly diminished sample sizes make it difficult to identify the coefficients.
Regressions by Year
The signs tend to be consistent with those from the pooled samples. Of the variables that had been signiÞcant in at least some of the pooled speciÞcations only investment does not attain statistical signiÞcance in at least one year.
Regional Dummies
To conserve space we have not included in the foregoing tables the coefficients on the re- 
Discussion and Conclusions
We have presented a case study of the diffusion of computers across countries. Another very robust result is that computer investment responds positively to a country's openness to manufacturing imports from the OECD. In the Full Sample, a 10% increase in manufacturing imports per worker from the OECD leads to a roughly 6% increase in com- case studies of new technology diffusion, on data with improved time series comparability, it might be possible to exploit the above mentioned diferences in predictions to asess the relative importance of the two views. 15 An alternative interpretation is that the complementarity between human capital and computers is in consumption (educated people derive utility from computers) rather than in production. As a partial check on this hypothesis we have re-run some of our speciÞcations with an interaction term between the share of agriculture and the share of skilled labor. The coefficient is signiÞcantly negative. Hence, human capital is less conducive to computer adoption in countries with a relatively large share of agriculture. It seems to us that this supports a production over a consumption interpretation of the complementarity between human capital and computers.
puter investment per worker (10% in the Non-Exporting Sample, 4% in the OCAM Sample).
The interpretation of this Þnding that is most consistent with the existing literature is that countries that import manufactures from the OECD beneÞt from a knowledge spillover. As people and products from the manufacturing industries of technologically advanced countries are the most likely to possess or reßect knowledge of computers, their uses and operations, exposure to such people and products allows other countries to learn about, and hence adopt, the new technology. 16 We should stress that imports of computers are always and everywhere a minuscule fraction of overall manufacturing imports from the OECD. Hence, it is emphatically not the case that the signiÞcance of manufacturing imports from the OECD is driven by computers being a component of such imports. The fact that in the Non-Exporting Sample imports of manufactures originating outside of the OECD are associated (albeit weakly) with lower propensities to invest in computers remains somewhat of a puzzle.
In the Full Sample and in the OCAM Sample there is some evidence (at the 10% level)
of an effect from openness in the other direction, namely exports. One possible rationale for a role from exports is that traded goods, especially when directed to OECD countries, must satisfy standards of uniform quality, packaging, disclosure, and barcoding that can only be met through the application of computer technology. If this was the case, however, we would expect exports of manufacturing to OECD countries to explain most of the action as far as export variables are concerned. This variable is indeed signiÞcant at the 10% level in one instance, but so is exports of non-manufacturing goods to non-OECD countries. Overall, we think the export results are rather weak. The fact that the only trade-related variable that reliably predicts computer adoption is manufacturing imports from the OECD reinforces a knowledge-spillover interpretation.
Both in the Full Sample and in the Non-Exporting Sample computer adoption is strongly associated with high overall investment rates -for example because of high saving rates. In the Full Sample, a 10% increase in investment per worker leads to an increase in computer investment per worker in the 2 to 3% range. In the Non-Exporting Sample the estimates are in the 6-to-9% range. agriculture in GDP is associated with lower adoption of computers. In the Full Sample a one-percentage-point increase in the share of agriculture leads to a 2-to-3 percent decline in computer investment per worker (6 to 8% in the OCAM Sample). Unfortunately, the two samples disagree strongly on the question that is perhaps more interesting, i.e., whether there are differential effects on the relative shares of manufacturing and services: no in the Full Sample, yes in the OCAM Sample, where manufacturing appears to be more computerfriendly than services. The full-sample result is consistent with the view that computers are a general purpose technology, with a broad scope of applicability both in manufacturing and services. 18 The OCAM result points to more sector-speciÞcity -at least at this level of aggregation -with a bias towards manufacturing.
In several speciÞcations for the Non-Exporting Sample and especially for the OCAM Sample we Þnd a role for the degree of property rights protection. This effect is not robust in speciÞcations that include export variables, which suggests an interpretation in terms of omitted-variable bias. However, we also note that the Non-Exporting and OCAM Sample sizes are quite small, so that another interpretation could be that we have overstretched the degrees of freedom by including the export variables (which are almost never signiÞcant in these samples anyway). Because of this ambiguity, we do not dismiss the property-right result. When signiÞcant, the effect of property rights protection is large. The index is on a scale from 0 to 10 and a unit increase would lead to an increase in computer investment per worker in excess of 10% (in the OCAM Sample). To make this more concrete, moving from the Þrst quartile to the median of the distribution of the property rights index requires a 2-point increase. It would be easy to rationalize a role for property rights in embodied technology adoption. Computers, for example, are relatively easy to conÞscate, steal, or loot.
Interestingly, however, the results suggest that property rights protection is important even after controlling for general investment. This might indicate that property rights protection has an impact on the composition of investment over and above its impact on the general level of investment.
Subject to the same caveats about the role of export variables, in the OCAM Sample we also Þnd a strong negative effect on computer adoption from a large government share in GDP. A one-percentage-point increase in government spending as a share of GDP is associated with an increase in computer investment per worker of 2-to-3 percent. The result that large governments are bad for technology adoption would make a lot of sense: public bureaucracies are notoriously conservative and generally lack the incentives to seize new efficiency-enhancing opportunities. A country in which a larger share of economic activity is dominated by this inertia will be slower at embracing new technologies.
18 See Helpman (1998) for a collection of contributions on GPTs.
In none of the three samples there is any evidence that particular foreign language skills are important determinants of technology adoption.
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